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WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: DEAD OR ALIVE? 
The origins of the Washington Consensus lie in the debt crisis of the 1980s in Latin American coun­
tries. Their economies - built on the import substitution strategy, strongly protectionist, living on 
borrowed money and wasting that money - were on the verge of bankruptcy. The cure was adopting 
new economic strategies advised by international financial institutions, mostly, the International 
Monetary Fund. Also, western economic think tanks were preparing receipts for economic recovery 
of Latin American countries. Institute for International Economics, located in Washington, D. C., also 
presented its proposal - called Washington Consensus - that was accepted by governments of most 
of Latin American countries. In very short way it can be described as a set of neoliberal reforms that 
had to help Latin American economies to get out of the deep crisis. 
It is almost twenty years since the Consensus was adopted. In that period Latin American coun­
tries went through a lot of economic, political and social crisis. In my paper I would like to answer 
the question: Are the recommendations of Washington Consensus still actual for Latin America? 
Moreover, are they still implemented? A lot of factors make it difficult to prove that the ideas of 
neoliberal transformation in Latin America are today commonly accepted in the region. As the 21s' 
century started, deep creeks have appeared within the consensus. The financial crisis at the turn of 
the centuries, disappointment of citizens from neoliberal reforms of its governments, and disillusion­
ment from the U. S. policy toward Latin America caused that it seems to be proper to find new - not 
necessary Washington - consensus. 
The origins of the Washington Consensus lie in the debt crisis of the “lost decade” which 
is what the 1980s used to be called in regards to the Latin American economic situation 
in that period. There were several causes of debt in almost all Latin American states. 
First, there was an extremely high level of foreign debt, most of it floating interest rates. 
Second, the impact of a very large rise in international interest rates, mostly in U. S. 
dollars, at a time when this currency was raising, upon the service debt. Third, decline 
in export earnings due to a deep recession and fall of prices for main export products. 
And finally, it was a loss of confidence on the part of lenders (Kuczyński 1988, 73). By 
August, 1982, the government of Mexico declared that it could not meet all the loan 
payments that were due. This caused considerable concern in the international financial 
community. In the middle of the lost decade most of the new democratic governments 
in Latin America realized that the old development model of the post-world war period 
was inadequate now. Until the eruption of the debt crisis, Latin America developed an 
import substitution industrialization (ISI), believing that it would be a panacea for its 
underdevelopment and economic problems. ISI became official policy and was pursued 
vigorously through increasing domestic manufacturing. The aim of the ISI was to use 
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the resources of the state-led development to stimulate industrialization that would lead 
to homegrown manufactures replacing those previously imported. ISI worked for some 
time, but by the 1970s and 1980s it was clear that the strategy was no longer appropri­
ate. We can mention at least a few reasons for its discrediting. It had led to immensely 
bloated and inefficient state sectors, to widespread and endemic corruption within 
state controlled industries. The proportion of the GNP generated through the state 
sector climbed to 60-80 percent, reaching nearly to the levels of socialist economies 
and progressively squeezing out the private sector. Most of the state-owned industries 
turned into gigantic patronage agencies filled with the party or regime in power. The 
inequality of ISI to adjust quickly or flexibly to the changing international economic 
environment, and the uncompetitiveness of local products that were secured by high 
tariffs also caused its discreditation (Wiarda 2005, 169). The disastrous effects of the 
lost decade of the 1980s that was the culmination of non-effective ISI caused conditions 
for deep reforms to appear. 
As Latin American nations became even more dependent on external sources to 
solve their financial problems, the role of international financial institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) became even stronger. The failure of the Cruzado Plan in 
Brazil, and the slow collapse of the Austral Plan in Argentina, further cautioned Latin 
American leaders from embracing the siren of deep adjustment. By the late 1980s 
a number of countries had adopted the far-reaching goals of internal economic change 
(Roett 1992, 141). Partly it was the result of conditioning of the loans for debtors on 
structural reforms. It was argued that the Latin American nations must take the bitter 
pill of austerity through these structural adjustments. Government costs and inflation 
had to be reduced through such measures as fiscal reform, monetary restraint, cutting 
back jobs and services in the public sector and stopping government subsidies for 
basic goods and petroleum. Likewise, wages were to be held down as a way of checking 
inflation and keeping wage costs at bay in the ever more important export industries 
(Politics of Latin America..., 164). 
That was the moment when some economists concluded that Latin America 
required a radical change of course by abandoning the state-led protectionism of the 
ISI model. In the 1980s even the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) - who up until that moment had strongly supported ISI - had 
begun to shift towards new ideas (Reid 2007,134). These ideas about what would make 
Latin America prosperous were collected in 1989 by John Williamson. The recom­
mendations he enumerated, were as follows:
1) fiscal discipline;
2) redirection of public expenditures;
3) tax reform;
4) financial liberalization;
5) adopting a single, competitive exchange rate;
6) trade liberalization;
7) eliminating barriers to foreign direct investments;
8) privatizing state-owned enterprises;
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9) deregulating market entry and competition;
10) ensuring secure property rights (Latin American Adjustment..., 1990).'
This set of recommendations for economic development is called the Washington 
Consensus. Barbara Liberska, a Polish scholar researching the economics of Latin 
America, writes about the “decalogue” of the Washington Consensus (Liberska 2008, 
23-35). As we talk about the consensus, it is important to explain whose consensus it 
was. Despite the fact that recommendations were directed to Third World countries, 
they were not among those who formulated the consensus. It had emerged among 
political elites in Washington, the American Congress, the presidential administration, 
economists of the IMF, the World Bank and the IDB, and American think thanks. It 
was consensus, but only in the sense that, it was consensus among different actors 
of U.S. politics, economists, and international finance institutions dominated by the 
United States.
The main elements of the Washington Consensus were privatization, deregulation 
and liberalization. It seems appropriate to add democratization as a political condi­
tion of economic recovery and development. Privatization of former state companies 
is said to lead to the enhancement of competition, and therefore efficiency. Deregula­
tion, often seen as the second best option to privatization, involves the trimming of 
the state sector and the introduction of competitive practices that make this sector 
run among lines similar to those of the private sphere. Liberalization is a policy of 
openness to international trade and investment, so that countries can grow through 
increased exports and foreign investment. It also included liberalization of the capital 
account, which meant that individuals could now move money from their domestic 
currency to a foreign one (Kiely 2005, 99). Meanwhile, a democratic political system 
helps to provide a stable long-term climate in which the economy can grow and the 
middle class can prosper. In turn, economic development, free trade, and privatization 
help to provide a better climate for democracy and human rights to be established and 
consolidated (Wiarda 1997). Enforced by the U.S.-dominated international financial 
institutions and by the absorption of a free market version of neoclassical economics 
by local elites, the protection of secure investment climate quickly became the region’s 
economic and political priority (Hershberg, Rosen 2006, 7). Also, the timing of the 
formulation of the decalogue at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s was not accidental. It 
coincided with the collapse of the iron curtain and then the Soviet Union, its ideological 
apparatus and the socialist bloc. Discreditation of socialist ideas and centrally planned 
economies created an urgent and widespread need for an alternative set of ideas about 
how to organize economic and political life (Naim 2000).
The results of the adoption of neoliberal reforms were mixed. Many countries stabi­
lized their budgets by restricting budget deficits. Fighting inflation was finally success­
ful, as some countries reached very low levels of inflation. Also, trade liberalization was 
successful. All Latin American states - except Cuba of course - changed their course 
in international trade almost 180 degrees. They liberalized foreign investment, opened
1 John Williamson (ed.). 1990. Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened. Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics.
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up their markets, lowered tariffs, privatized state-owned enterprises, and abandoned 
the main ideological props of their former economic nationalism. Indeed, by the mid- 
1990s, it was the governments of developing countries - including Latin American 
republics - that most strongly embraced the liberal trade and investment creed. The 
new orthodoxy represented the intellectual victory of neoliberal economics (Holsti 
2004, 234). In this situation, what is wrong with the Washington Consensus? Why do 
so many criticize it, why do some of those critics call for post-Washington Consensus 
order, and others announce its death? Why nowadays are there considerations of vari­
ous projects and ideas that are completely different from the decalogue of the Wash­
ington Consensus? First of all, those few positive results of neoliberal changes did not 
produce higher economic growth nor improve the living standard of the majority of 
the societies. Neoliberal reforms of recent years and integration with global economy 
have not realized many expectations. Instead of high economic growth, in the period of 
1990-2003 GNP rose 3.3 percent per year. Instead of industrialization, we can observe 
in many Latin American States deindustrialization and a downfall of employment in 
industry. Minimum wages did not increase. The GINI index grew from 0.53 in 1990 
to 0.57 in 2005; the World Competitiveness Index dropped (Liberska 2008). Some 
researchers accurately point out that Latin America is not a monolithic, unitary entity. 
The continent houses multiple actors - some regional, some “informal” - albeit power­
ful, and all of them relevant (Dominguez 1998). Meanwhile the recommendation was 
the same to all developing countries without differentiating specific characteristics of 
each country. Those who criticized the Washington Consensus often underline that 
all Latin America was treated as one subject and neoliberal reforms were universal 
panacea for different diseases. It is not a necessary truth. Neoliberal changes in Latin 
American countries were taking place in different circumstances. Some countries 
reformed drastically and quickly - as for example Argentina during the Carlos Menem 
administration or Fujimori’s Peru - while others did relatively little, such as Venezuela 
(Reid 2007). However, deep cracks have appeared within the Consensus’s decalogue. 
Already at the end of the 1980s its legitimacy had come into question in the face of an 
increasingly effective citizens’ backlash in the North and South, and there is growing 
dissension within the ranks of its backers (Broad, Cavanagh 1999).
So, what is the condition of the Washington Consensus today, twenty years after 
the eruption of enthusiasm produced by the neoliberal proposals? Is it dead or alive? 
To answer this question it is necessary to analyze contemporary programs of economic 
development in Latin America. After two decades of technocratic reforms, and with 
commodity prices soaring, in one country after another leftist administrations are 
coming to power. This seems to be a response for a region caught between two sets 
of closely related challenges: on the one hand rising mass mobilization, and on the 
other strong public discontent with reform strategies, questioned by their failure to 
generate high levels of growth, to incorporate disenfranchised groups and to promote 
more equitable patterns of income distribution (Tussie, Heidrich 2008, 45). What is 
the Washington Consensus’s sin that has produced such strong public opposition? 
As Joseph Stiglitz said, a neoliberal model of globalization was imposed onto Latin 
American countries without taking into account the different conditions in those 
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countries, and brought very limited benefits for limited groups of the population, for 
very few economic sectors, and only for a few regions (Stiglitz 2002). Howard Wiarda 
enumerates four mistaken assumptions. First, according to him, was the belief that 
the freeing up of economies would give rise to a dynamic entrepreneurial class that 
could substitute for the state’s role in the economy and stimulate economic growth. 
But dynamic entrepreneurial groups did not emerge. What passes for entrepreneurs is 
usually the friends, relatives, and cronies of a regimes powerful people. They often have 
special access to government contracts and monopolies. The second assumption was 
that as these economies were freed up, a lot of financial institutions would emerge that 
would assist in the development process. But banks, capital markets, stock exchanges, 
and the like in developing countries also tend to be weak and cannot be created quickly. 
Third, the assumption that the freed-up economies would produce growth, jobs, and 
benefits for the lower and middle class also failed. This assumption did not take into 
account the class structure and class attitudes in Latin America. These tend to be very 
rigid and not egalitarian. The effect was that the rich are getting richer and the lower 
classes have received few benefits at all and have often become worse off. The fourth 
assumption was that privatization would lead to greater honesty and efficiency in the 
running of major, formerly state-owned, industries. But in the developing countries of 
Latin America only the elites or foreign companies have money to buy these industries. 
Also, it was often military officers and crony officials close to the regime in power that 
had inside knowledge and thus an inside track to take over the former state-owned 
firms (Wiarda 2005, 176-178).
The impression that the Washington Consensus was a set of rigid, almost unalter­
able, theoretical propositions about which the powerful and the knowledgeable had 
no doubt was widespread. However, the often implicit corollary espoused by the more 
politically motivated of the Consensus’s proponents was that most dissent with its 
policies was inspired by anti-market ideologies, nationalism and anti-Americanism. 
Also, it is worth underlining that since the beginning advocates of the Washington 
Consensus have been divided about the pace and sequence of reforms. Profound dif­
ferences quickly emerged about the need for desirability of what came to be known 
as the application of a “shock therapy” approach to policy reforms. Others argued for 
a slower, more sequenced pace (Naim 2000).
Since Latin America and the Caribbean countries embarked on some kind of neo­
liberal reforms course in the 1980s and the 1990s, it is possible to observe that overall 
performance has been mixed. After the lost decade of the 1980s there was a good average 
growth rate in the first half of the 1990s, but a lower one in the second half. Arguably, the 
lower average in the second half was due to the effects of various financial crises, starting 
with the Tequila crisis in the mid-1990s, continuing with the repercussions of the Asian 
crisis in 1997 and 1998, and culminating in Argentina’s collapse at the turn of 2001 and 
2002 (Huber, Solt 2004). In 2002, Latin America’s economy shrank 0.5 percent, scared 
investors took 39 million dollars out of the region, and 7 million more people plummeted 
into the ranks of the extremely poor, surviving on less than 1 dollar per day (Latin Trade 
2003). In those circumstances it is not surprising that Latin American leaders have been 
looking for alternative ideas to those constructed by the Washington Consensus.
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Since the end of the twentieth century there has been a great debate over the influ­
ence of neoliberal reforms on Latin American economies and their development. Today 
it seems appropriate to talk about the post-Washington Consensus proposals and 
recommendations. It is an effect of broad criticism of the Washington Consensus and 
changes on the Latin American political scene. For a few years most of the countries of 
the region have been governed by leftist governments that have built their position on 
strong opposition toward the decalogue of the Washington Consensus. Leftist politi­
cians have won elections in the last few years in twelve countries, including Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua. This has caused is to 
be difficult today to say that the Washington Consensus is alive. But it is also necessary 
to underline that Latin Americas turn to the left does not mean that these countries 
are realizing the same economic strategy. There are a lot of differences between Hugo 
Chavezs Venezuela or Evo Morales’s Bolivia and Chile governed by Michelle Bachelet 
or Lulas Brazil. These differentiations show that there are two trends in contesting the 
Washington Consensus. One is radical, and strongly anti-American. Hugo Chávez, Evo 
Morales, and Rafael Correa represent it. They want to promote the idea of twenty-first- 
century socialism as an alternative to the Washington Consensus’s neoliberal model. 
On the other hand, there is a more restrained model. Representatives of this position 
accept, in general, the current order of the market economy and the necessity of adjust­
ment to globalization. However, they try to realize social policy which could eliminate 
the negative effects of neoliberal reforms. The aims of this kind of economic policy are 
speeding up economic growth and supporting social programs that help the poorest 
groups in their struggle with poverty.
The idea of twenty-first-century socialism (el socialismo del siglo XXI) is a project 
of UNAM professor Heinz Dietrich Steffan (Steffan 2000). According to this proposal, 
neither capitalism nor communism has been able to solve the most important prob­
lems of development. The twenty-first-century socialism model calls for the creation 
of an equable economy based on the value theory, and a political system based on 
a participating democracy (Gawrycki 2008, 50). The new socialism has to be built on 
the following foundations:
1 ) increased engagement of state in the economy and limitation of market economy 
rules;
2) state control of natural resources, renegotiation of hitherto existing contracts 
or nationalization;
3) utilization of financial resources from oil and gas on infrastructural deve­
lopment;
4) various forms of property;
5) better redistribution of income and liquidation of inequalities;
6) broad social programs;
7) participating democracy which could ensure the majority of society participation 
in the economic, social, cultural and political development (Liberska 2008, 30).
In 2005 Hugo Chávez claimed “we’re starting to build our own socialist model.” 
The main feature of this Venezuelan twenty-first-century socialism - or “chavismo,” as 
others call it - is a drastic increase of public spending as a result of the huge rise in oil 
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prices, as well as a bigger share of oil revenue taken by the government through taxes 
and royalties on its joint-venture partners. Chavezs anti-American and anti-neoliberal 
policy can be well described by his attitude toward economic integration in the West­
ern Hemisphere. General disillusionment in Latin America from George W. Bushs 
foreign policy encouraged Chavez to coordinate policies among various governments. 
His initial project, Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), included a vague 
proposal to stimulate what was called a “humanist self-managing economy” (Parker 
2005). Chavezs policy in Venezuela - strongly anti-liberal and anti-American - is the 
best example of modern populism in Latin America. He has increasingly seemed to see 
himself as Castros successor. He conceived the Bolivarian revolution to be continental 
in scope, like its Cuban predecessor. Yet rather than a twenty-first-century socialist, 
Chavez most resembled some of the political figures from Latin American past: the 
twentieth-century populists and the nineteenth-century military caudillos (Reid 2007, 
177). An attempt at building a twenty-first-century socialism model has also been 
visible in Bolivia since Evo Morales became president. He is the first Indian president 
in a country where the great majority of the population is indigenous. However, after 
almost two years in power, changes in economic policy have been very few. He has 
declared the nationalization of the oil and gas industries but has called on foreign 
investors in this sector to accept new contracts that would turn them from owners 
of hydrocarbon resources into providers of services for exploitation. After months of 
heavy bargaining, Morales eventually achieved his goal, with all foreign companies 
signing to the new rules. The policy of the Bolivian president is to redistribute wealth 
proceedings - not income - with plans to nationalize mining, and redistribute agri­
cultural land in the eastern provinces (Tussie, Heidrich 2008, 61-62).
On the other side of diverging from the decalogue of the Washington Consensus 
are solutions adopted by more moderate leaders. A lot of scholars mention here 
Luis Inácio Lula da Silva from Brazil, known to all as Lula. During the election cam­
paign Lula repeatedly promised to change the country’s economic model based on 
Washington Consensus recommendations (Williamson 2003). Since he took office 
in 2003, his promotion of social consciousness has radically changed the role of the 
state there, now providing minimum income levels to some 44 million people, or 25 
percent of the population, through the Bolsa Familia program (Tussie, Heidrich 2008, 
56). President Lula asked, “How many countries have achieved what we have: fiscal 
responsibility and a strong social policy at the same time?” And he replied, “Never in 
the economic history of Brazil have we had the solid foundation, that we have now” 
(The Economist, Feb. 26, 2006). Lulas government followed a leftist agenda to deal 
with social problems, especially aid to the poorest sectors of the population, generat­
ing state jobs and increasing pensions. In macroeconomic policy, his fiscal largesse, 
however, contributed to an increasing debt. To sustain this, he has increased the size 
of the state in the economy.
In March 2007, there was the Economic Forum for Latin America held in Santiago 
de Chile. Latin American leaders, most of them building their economic agenda on 
the contestation of the Washington Consensus, discussed ideas and priorities in the 
economic development of that region. The program that emerged during the meeting 
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has come to be called the Santiago Consensus. It can be perceived as a kind of comple­
ment to the decalogue of the Washington Consensus. There is talk about the necessity 
of continuing the positive effects of neoliberal reform, for example low inflation or 
opening of the economies. What is new is the necessity of reforms that would eliminate 




3) labor market reforms;
4) reforms that would ensure a stable financial system;
5) increase of innovations (R&D);
6) infrastructure development;
7) environment protection;
8) improvement of competitiveness;
9) reduction of poverty areas;
10) more fair income distribution (Liberska 2008, 34).
Does it mean that we have a new decalogue, this time the decalogue of the Santiago 
Consensus? Doubtful. Although the recommendations from Santiago are generally 
accepted, there are still big distinctions in the economic policies between countries 
of the region. Also, there is the issue of globalization and its benefits for developing 
countries. This is the subject of the so-called Montreal Consensus presented by former 
Canadian Finance Minister and Prime Minister Paul Martin. The heart of the Montreal 
Consensus is a more balanced vision of how developing countries and poor countries 
can share benefits of the global economy. It arises from the general perception that 
developing countries are not threatened by globalization per se as much as by being left 
out and left behind. The solution is not to reverse globalization itself, but rather find 
ways to share the wealth and integration it brings (Marie-Slaughter 2004, 246).
What is the condition of the Washington Consensus after two decades of neoliberal 
reforms in Latin America? Is it dead or alive? If we analyze the term “Washington Con­
sensus” semantically, it would be definitively dead. There is no consensus over the issue 
of development of Latin American countries. Definitively there is no consensus between 
most Latin American governments and the U.S. administration. But there is also hardly 
any consensus in Washington on the issue of economic policy in Latin America. Barack 
Obama - building his policy on strong anti-Bushism - has begun questioning some goals 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement. The period of neoliberal reforms in Latin 
America is difficult to estimate. It is obvious that deep structural reforms that were in 
agreement with the Washington Consensus recommendation have been indispensable 
for getting the region out of the debt crisis and the lost decade. Huge external debt and 
the economic crash of the 1980s were results of the previous development model based 
on the import substitution industrialization. Trade liberalization, markets opening and 
democratization of political systems were top priorities for economic recovery. It is also 
obvious that there were mistakes in realizing the neoliberal model. They caused the eco­
nomic turmoil from the turn of the century, continued social and economic inequalities, 
and the inability of democratic governments to provide goods and services for their 
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populations to lead to widespread disillusionment with the Washington Consensus. 
After its early successes, the consensus has lost its luster (Wiarda 2005, 183).
The Washington Consensus is neither dead nor alive. It is the past. Its rules helped 
to recover Latin American countries from the deepest crisis since the Great Depres­
sion of the 1930s. But nowadays there is a need for a new economic program. The 
Washington Consensus did not resolve the most fundamental problems of the region: 
huge inequalities, vast areas of poverty, vulnerability to international financial crises, 
and technological underdevelopment. There is a general agreement that the neoliberal 
model is not a proper one, or more accurately, is not enough for Latin America. We 
can observe some attempts to complete this model. But it has to be complementary, 
not a negation, as the twenty-first-century socialism program seems to be.
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